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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper, I explore the impact that private equity-backing of acquired firms has on 
the characteristics of acquisitions of unlisted firms by public companies. More specifically, I 
address the impact of PE-backing on announcement period abnormal returns to acquirers. 
Many  empirical  studies  in  corporate  finance  have  analyzed  the  determinants  of  acquirer 
abnormal returns around acquisition decision announcements. The relative size of the deal, 
the public or private status of the target, the uncertainty about target valuation, and the means 
of payment are among the most important determinants. This paper focuses on the status of 
the target. Since the 1970’s, academic research has demonstrated that acquiring shareholders 
of publicly traded targets earn neutral or negative returns around acquisition announcements 
(Andrade  et  al.  2001).  However,  many  recent  studies  have  reported  average  positive 
announcement returns to acquirers of unlisted firms (Chang, 1998; Faccio et al., 2006; Fuller 
et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004). The objective of this paper is to re-examine the role of the 
status  of  the  target  in  acquirer  returns  by  separating  targets  that  received  private  equity-
backing from targets with traditional private shareholders. Do acquisitions of private equity-
backed targets trigger a different price reaction for acquirer shareholders than acquisitions of 
non-private equity-backed targets?  
The term “Private Equity” (referred to as PE in the remainder of the paper), does not 
have the same meaning in Europe as it does in the U.S. In the U.K. and in Continental Europe, 
it  always  refers  to  the  industry  as  a  whole,  including  both  venture  capital  and  buyout 
investments, while in the U.S. it is usually used for buyout deals only. For the purpose of this 
research, PE investors are defined in a broad sense including both investors in venture capital 
(henceforth, VC) and buyouts transactions. Both types of investors share unique attributes that 
distinguish them from traditional shareholders and that should influence the sale process of 
unlisted firms. Moreover, a large number of investments in Europe are made by PE firms 
investing in VC as well as in buyout deals.  
Academic research to date has shown that VC/PE investors have specific capacities. In 
particular, VC/PE investors are in a position to certify the true value of a firm (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991). They also develop strong capabilities in building large networks of contacts 
(Hochberg  et  al.,  2007;  Ivashina  and  Kovner,  2008).  Both  attributes  may  result  in  better 
negotiating capacities and suggest that PE investors could act, during the sale process, in ways 
that traditional investors may not be able to replicate. This makes understanding the impact of 3 
 
PE-backing  on  the  profitability  of  unlisted  target  acquisitions  an  interesting  empirical 
question. 
I  use  a  sample  of  2010  acquisitions  of  unlisted  companies  completed  by  public 
acquirers from 17 Western European countries between 2003 and 2008. Through a process of 
manual identification, I find that 12.5% of the target companies are PE-backed. I classify an 
acquisition as PE-backed if the target company received PE-funding in the past and I also 
require that at least one of the PE investors that provided funding in the past is still involved 
in the target when the public company buys it. PE investors are unlikely to have any impact 
on the sale process if they have exited the target company before the acquisition deal. The 
results  indicate  that  acquisitions  of  PE-backed  companies  differ  from  other  unlisted 
acquisitions.  They  are  more  likely  to  involve  larger  acquirers,  larger  targets  relative  to 
acquirer size, and high-tech targets; they are more likely to occur in an unrelated industry and 
to  be  partially  stock-financed.  When  I  turn  to  the  impact  of  PE-backing  on  acquirer 
cumulative abnormal returns (thereafter, CARs), I observe that the market reacts significantly 
less positively to the announcement of an acquisition of a PE-backed company. The mean 
(median) CARs for announcements of acquisitions of PE-backed targets are 1.12% (0.45%), 
which is significantly lower than the mean (median) CARs of 2.11% (0.97%) for acquisitions 
of non-PE-backed targets. The “PE-backing effect” remains after controlling for a large set of 
deal  and  acquirer  characteristics,  which  have  been  shown  to  be  significant  in  explaining 
acquirer returns in prior literature. Additionally, I use a propensity score matching method to 
select  a  matched  sample  of  acquisitions  of  non-PE-backed  firms  that  are  comparable  to 
acquisitions of PE-backed firms in a wide range of characteristics in which the two groups 
differ in the initial sample. Using the matched sample of non-PE-backed targets, I confirm 
that the presence of PE firms in the targets lowers returns to acquirers. 
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first paper to analyze the impact that PE-backing has on the returns to acquirers of unlisted 
firms in Europe. Results to date focus on the U.S market only, are very rare, and appear to be 
conflicting (Gompers and Xuan, 2006; Masulis and Nahata, 2009
2). Second, this paper sheds 
new light on how VC/PE investors manage and influence the exit process of their portfolio 
companies. Starting with Megginson and Weiss (1991), a number of studies investigate the 
role played by VC/PE investors during the initial public offerings process and report their 
certification  capacity.  Analyses  of  the  role  of  PE  investors  in  trade  sales  are  almost 
                                                 
2  Additionally, both papers focus on VC-backing. Because, VC constitutes a subset of the entire PE in the 
economy, those papers are not perfectly comparable to my study. 4 
 
nonexistent. However, they are particularly necessary as trade sales of portfolio companies 
are by far the largest exit routes in Europe. In 2008, according to the European Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Association (EVCA), trade sales comprised approximately 40% of PE 
exits  (by  amount)  undertaken  by  PE  firms  based  in  Europe,  while  divestments  by  public 
offerings (initial public offerings and sale of quoted equity) continued to fall, representing 
only  5%  of  total  divestment.  The  results  are  consistent  with  PE  investors  increasing  the 
negotiating power of target shareholders when portfolio companies are sold through trade 
sales, which results in acquirers paying a higher price when they buy PE-backed targets. Last, 
this paper adds to the rare evidence on returns to European acquirers of unlisted firms.  I 
observe mean positive CARs for acquirers of unlisted firms, which is consistent with the 
findings in Conn et al. (2005) and Faccio et al. (2006). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature.  Section  3  presents  the  sample  construction  methodology.  Section  4  defines  the 
variables and Section 5 describes the sample. Section 6 provides univariate and multivariate 
analyses of acquirer returns.  In Section 7, a propensity score matching approach is exposed as 
a robustness check. Section 8 offers conclusion and suggestions for future research. 
 
2.  Related Literature 
 
This  paper  is  related  and  contributes  to  different  strands  of  the  literature.  First,  a 
number of recent papers examine the effect of unlisted target acquisitions on acquirer returns. 
They show that acquirers achieve zero or negative average announcement period cumulative 
abnormal  returns  (CARs)  when  acquiring  listed  targets  and  positive  average  CARs  when 
acquiring  unlisted  targets  (Chang,  1998;  Fuller  et  al.,  2002;  Moeller  et  al.,  2004).  This 
phenomenon is also observed in Europe. Faccio et al. (2006) find on a sample of acquisitions 
in 17 Western European countries over the period 1996-2001 that acquirers of listed targets 
earn an insignificant average abnormal return of -0.38%, while acquirers of unlisted targets 
earn a significant average abnormal return of 1.48%. Although the fundamental factors that 
explain this “listing effect” remain elusive (Faccio et al., 2006), Fuller et al. (2002) posit that 
one explanation for the differing market reaction is that acquirers receive a better price when 
they  buy  unlisted  firms.  Officer  (2007)  actually  documents  discounts  for  acquisitions  of 
unlisted targets that average 15% to 30% relative to multiples paid to acquire comparable 
publicly traded firms.  5 
 
Second, the paper is related to the large body of literature on the certification role of 
VC/PE. Empirical support for this certification role of VC/PE investors has essentially been 
provided in initial public offerings (henceforth, IPO) settings. Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
find that underpricing in VC-backed IPOs is significantly lower than in non-VC-backed IPOs, 
which is consistent with the idea that venture capitalists certify that the offering price of the 
issue reflects all available and relevant inside information. VC-backed IPOs experience better 
long-run performance than non-VC-backed IPOs (Brav and Gompers, 1997). The certification 
role that venture capitalists play in the IPO process has however been questioned. Lee and 
Wahal (2004) observe that VC-backing results in higher IPO underpricing after controlling 
for endogeneity in the receipt of venture funding. Lee and Masulis (2008) show that neither 
VC  investment,  nor  backing  by  more  reputable  venture  capitalists,  significantly  restrain 
earnings management by IPO issuers, which is inconsistent with them implicitly certifying the 
quality of issuers’ financial reporting.  
The first condition for third-party certification to be believable for outside investors is 
that the certifying agent has reputational capital at stake  on not selling overvalued assets 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991). Because European PE investors repeatedly exit their portfolio 
companies through trade sale (as mentioned earlier, according to the EVCA, trade sales are by 
far the largest exit routes in Europe accounting for approximately 40% of PE exits), they have 
a very strong incentive to maintain access to the trade sale market on good conditions and 
therefore  have  to  establish  a  reputation  for  honesty.  According  to  Megginson  and  Weiss 
(1991), the value of the reputational capital must exceed the maximum possible benefit which 
could be obtained by certifying falsely and the services of the certifying agent must be costly 
for the firm. These authors show that both conditions are met by venture capitalists when 
exiting through an IPO. There is no reason to believe that they are not met when VC/PE 
investors exit through a trade sale. Last, certification by PE investors is feasible because they 
continuously monitor their portfolio companies, notably through participation at the board 
level  (Lerner,  1995).  PE  investors  therefore  have  means  of  reducing  the  information 
asymmetry faced by acquirers of private firms. Moreover, because PE firms specialize in 
exiting private investment, they are expert in pricing.  
Third,  many  papers  highlight  the  importance  of  networks  in  the  VC/PE  industry. 
Venture capitalists lean on their networks of contacts to help the company succeed (Gorman 
and  Sahlman,  1989;  Sahlman,  1990).  The  bank  relationships  of  PE  firms  help  to  lower 
leverage  buyouts  loan  spread  (Ivashina  and  Kovner,  2008).  Influential  network  positions 
developed through syndication of investments  make PE firms perform significantly better 6 
 
(Hochberg et al., 2007). PE firms’ extensive network of contacts should therefore help them 
in locating potential acquirers and, hence, increase the bidding competition. Competition in an 
acquisition decreases the returns to acquirers (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988) 
 Both certification skills and network capacities of PE investors should result in better 
price negotiating power and PE firms should obtain high prices for their companies. Because 
the market may view PE investors as good negotiators, I expect acquirers of non-PE-backed 
targets to perform relatively better than acquirers of a PE-backed target. Announcement of 
PE-backed firm acquisitions should have a negative impact on acquirer returns.  
Only recently has the literature considered the effects of PE-backing on acquisition 
acquirer announcement returns. Gompers and Xuan (2006) find that the market reacts less 
positively to the announcement of the acquisition of a VC-backed firm, while the results of 
Masulis  and  Nahata  (2009)  indicate  the  opposite  direction  after  using  a  propensity  score 
matching approach. While Gompers and Xuan (2006) attribute the smaller returns to the view 
that venture capitalists have a greater price negotiating ability or that the adverse selection 
problem is quite high, Masulis and Nahata (2009) suggest that their findings are the result of 
venture capitalists having interests which conflict with other investors. However, because, 
venture capital constitutes a subset of the entire PE in the economy, those papers are not 
perfectly comparable to this study. Additionally, they focus on the U.S. market only. 
 
3.  Sample Selection 
 
I  use  a  two-step  methodology  to  construct  the  sample.  First,  I  obtain  a  sample  of 
acquisitions  of  unlisted  targets  by  European  public  acquirers.  Second,  I  disentangle  deals 
involving PE-backed targets from other unlisted deals.  
 
a.  Acquisitions of Unlisted Targets by European Public Acquirers  
 
From Thomson Financial’s Mergers and Acquisitions database (hereafter referred to as 
the “M&A database”), I construct a sample of acquisitions of unlisted targets completed by 
European public acquirers. To be included in the sample, the following conditions must be 
satisfied: 
⁻  Acquirers are public companies. 7 
 
⁻  Targets are unlisted companies
3.  
⁻  Completed deals are announced and effective between January 1, 2003 and 
December 31, 2008. 
⁻  Nation of the acquiring companies includes 17 European countries (Austria, 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Republic  of 
Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Norway,  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). No restriction is imposed on the targets 
country of incorporation. 
⁻  Acquirers are listed on a stock market in one of the above listed European 
countries. Acquirer stocks have 3 days of return data available in Datastream 
around the takeover announcement date and have no more than 50% missing 
returns over a window of 240 days starting 40 days before the announcement 
day
 4. 
⁻  Buyers acquire 100% of target firm shares. The deal value is one million U.S. 
dollars or more and represents at least 1% of the acquirer’s market value of 
equity
5. 
⁻  Neither the acquirer nor the target is a financial institution or a utility or a 
government-related  company  or  a  real  estate-related  firm  (this  restriction 
avoids dealing with the special regulatory environment and accounting issues 
related to these sectors).   
Then,  I  construct  a  second  sample  including  all  transactions  completed  by  the 
acquirers of the above primary sample with a disclosed deal value of more than one million 
U.S. dollars. Contrary to the primary sample, this sample also includes acquisitions of public 
firms.  The  primary  sample  is  necessarily  included  in  the  second  sample.  Any  transaction 
occurring  less  than  one  month  after  another  acquisition  made  by  the  same  acquirer  is 
classified as “multiple acquisition”. When an acquiring firm announces two acquisitions or 
more on the same day, all these observations are considered as “multiple acquisitions”. Next, 
every  transaction  of  the  primary  sample  that  corresponds  to  a  “serial  acquisition”  in  the 
second sample is excluded from the primary sample because multiple acquisitions raise the 
                                                 
3 Unlisted companies include private firms and subsidiaries. 
4 As explained later, this window serves as the estimation period for the event study in this paper. Returns are 
computed as “weighted trade-to-trade returns”. 
5 To avoid problems with outliers, when computing the relative deal size, I exclude the few observations with a 
relative size equal to or above 3. 8 
 
problem of dependent observations due to overlapping observations. This initial screening 
gives 2033 acquisitions of unlisted targets. 
 
b.  Acquisitions of Unlisted PE-backed Targets by European Public Acquirers  
 
The next step consists of disentangling deals involving PE-backed targets from other 
unlisted target acquisitions. Because there are no common identifiers for linking companies 
listed in the M&A database and the VentureXpert database, I manually search for the 2033 
target names extracted from the M&A database in the VentureXpert database. I use the whole 
VentureXpert database, including operations from 1970 to 2008, with no country, nor amount 
restrictions. I do consider the match only in case the company has received PE financing 
before the acquisition date mentioned in the M&A database. When no match is found for a 
given target name, I repeat the search by substituting the target name extracted from the M&A 
database for its immediate parent name (whenever relevant and only in case this immediate 
parent  is  not  public).  I  find  that  275  companies  of  the  initial  sample  have  received  PE 
financings prior to being subject to an acquisition by a listed company (directly or through an 
immediate private parent).  
Second, I check whether PE firms are still active investors in the company at the time 
of the M&A transaction. 91 out of these 275 deals involve a sellside financial sponsor pointed 
out  by  the  M&A  database
6.  I  verify  that  the  financial  sponsor  mentioned  by  the  M&A 
database matches with the one extracted from the VentureXpert database. For the remaining 
184 deals, I manually check in press releases and/or on investors’ websites that at least one of 
the referred PE investors is still involved in the target at the time of the M&A transaction. I 
find out that 134 acquisitions involve a PE-backed target (or target immediate parent). Targets 
are not anymore PE-backed at the time of the M&A in 27 cases. In 23 cases, I am not able to 
conclude, and thus decide to exclude these deals from the sample for avoidance of bias. At 
this point, I have identified 225 acquisitions of PE-backed firms.  
The M&A database identifies 26 additional deals involving a sellside financial sponsor 
that have not been found in the match with the VentureXpert database. After checking in 
press releases and/or on investors’ websites that PE firms are still active investors in the 
                                                 
6 The M&A database flagships point out transactions with the seller, immediate or ultimate parent of target, 
immediate or ultimate parent of seller, being a “Financial Sponsor”. Financial sponsors are defined as companies 
that engage in private equity or venture capital transactions using capital raised by investors. 9 
 
company at the time of the M&A transaction, I also classify these transactions as involving a 
PE-backed target. 
To sum up, the final sample consists of 251 acquisitions of PE-backed targets and 
1759 acquisitions of non-PE-backed targets over the period 2003-2008. 
 
4.  Definition of Variables 
 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  understand  if  PE-backing  influences  returns  to 
acquirers  and  the  construction  of  the  key  explanatory  variable,  the  PE-Backed  Target 
indicator, has been explained in detail above. In this section, I discuss the construction of all 
the other variables used in this study. First, I explain how I compute acquirer announcement 
period returns. Next, I consider two categories of variables, which have been shown to be 
significant in explaining acquirer returns in prior literature, i.e. deal- and acquirer-specific 
characteristics.  
 
a.  Acquirer announcement period returns 
 
I measure acquirer returns by computing market model adjusted stock returns around 
initial acquisition announcements. I obtain the announcement dates from Thomson Financial’s 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) database. I compute 3-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) during the window [−1, +1], where event day 0 is either the day of announcement or 
the first trading day following the announcement if the announcement occurs on a non-trading 
day. 
For each observation in the sample, I use the market model to estimate normal returns: 
Rjt = αj + βjRMt + εjt , where Rjt is the observed dividend adjusted return for firm j on day t, 
RMt  is  the  relevant  country  stock  market  index  return,  αj  and  βj  are,  respectively,  the 
estimated OLS regression intercept and slope, and εjt is a regression residual. 
Returns on the share and on the market index are measured between days on which the 
share was traded. Using trade-to-trade returns gives correct conclusions for all level of trading 
frequency (Maynes and Rumsey, 1993), while most methods are misspecified as tests for 
detecting  abnormal  returns  when  stocks  trade  infrequently.  The  returns  for  interval  t  are 
divided by the square root of the number of days in the interval in order to correct for the fact 
that larger intervals will tend to give rise to larger returns.  10 
 
The model parameters are estimated using OLS regressions over a period of 240 days, 
starting  40  days  prior  to  the  event  window.  I  also  require  that  trade-to-trade  returns  are 
available in more than 50% of the days of the estimation period. 
 
b.  Deal- and Acquirer-Specific Characteristics 
 
The literature has shown that a number of deal and acquiring-firm characteristics are 
related to acquirer announcement returns in the U.S. While most of the evidence on these 
determinants  is  based  on  public  acquisition  samples,  studies  related  to  unlisted  target 
acquisitions  include  these  determinants  as  control  variables  and  sometimes  confirm  the 
relation reported for public acquisition samples. 
First, many studies on U.S. acquisitions indicate that acquirer announcement returns 
increase in relative deal size. This positive effect is observed by Asquith et al. (1983) on a 
sample of public acquisitions and by Moeller et al. (2004) on data including both public and 
unlisted targets
7. The results of Fuller et al. (2002) and Masulis and Nahata (2009) indicate 
the same positive relation when targets are unlisted. Following the literature, I define Relative 
Size as the ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity. Deal value is the total value 
of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses (in million U.S. dollars). 
Acquirer market value of equity is measured as of 20 trading days before the announcement 
(see Appendix for data definitions and sources). 
Synergies between the acquirer and the target are expected to be higher for focus-
increasing transactions than for diversifying transactions. Morck et al. (1990), Maquieira et al. 
(1998) and Moeller et al. (2004) find evidence that acquirer abnormal returns are higher in 
within-industry acquisitions than in diversifying acquisitions. Although the results for unlisted 
target acquisitions do not seem supportive of a focus-increasing effect on acquirer returns 
(Fuller et al., 2002; Masulis and Nahata, 2009), I include a Within-Industry dummy, which 
takes the value of 1 if the acquirer’s and the target’s primary two-digit SIC code coincide, 0 
otherwise.  
While higher returns may be expected in cross-border deals rather than in domestic 
acquisitions due to the internalization of synergies based on intangible assets, several factors 
point in the reverse direction, such as the difficulties in managing the post merger process due 
to regulatory and national cultural differences (see Conn et al. (2005) for a literature review). 
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Fuller et al. (2002) show that U.S. acquirers of private targets have lower acquirer returns 
when buying a foreign firm (this result does not hold for acquirers of public or subsidiary 
targets). The Cross-Border indicator equals 1 if the acquirer’s and the target’s home country 
differ, and is 0 otherwise. 
To  proxy  for  the  uncertainty  of  target  valuation,  I  use  a  high-tech  industry 
classification
8.  Due  to  the  importance  of  human  capital  and  intellectual  property  at  these 
companies, acquirers may face more uncertainty and the market may react more negatively to 
acquisitions of high-tech firms. The indicator variable High-Tech Target denotes whether the 
target  belongs  to  a  high-tech  industry,  which  are  defined  following  Loughran  and  Ritter 
(2004) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003).  
The  method  of  payment  is  associated  with  different  effects  on  acquirer  returns  in 
acquisitions of public versus private firms. Acquirer returns associated with stock deals are 
more positive than those associated with cash deals for the acquisitions of private firms, while 
the literature on acquisitions of public targets show that stock deals trigger more negative 
abnormal returns (Chang, 1998, Fuller et al., 2002; Travlos, 1987). Because there are frequent 
inconsistencies  between  the  field  reporting  descriptive  information  about  the  method  of 
payment and the field reporting the method of payment variable in the M&A database, I hand 
collect data using descriptive information reported in the M&A database. The variable Stock 
takes the value of 1 for deals which are at least partially stock-financed, 0 otherwise.  
A number of acquirer characteristics have also been shown to impact acquirer returns 
in the U.S. Notably, acquirer size, Tobin’s Q, and leverage influence the price reaction.  
Larger acquirers earn lower announcement returns than do smaller acquirers (Moeller 
et al., 2004; Masulis et al., 2007), which is also true for unlisted target acquisitions (Gompers 
and Xuan, 2006). I include Log Acquirer Size, which is the logarithm of acquirer market value 
of equity, measured 20 trading days before the announcement.   
Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) show that a high Tobin's Q increases acquirer 
returns. A low Tobin's Q might indicate poor quality of the acquiring firm's management and 
might therefore reduce acquirer returns. However, proxies for q have a negative significant 
coefficient  with  an  economically  trivial  effect  or  an  insignificant  coefficient  for  samples 
including  both  public  and  unlisted  targets  or  unlisted  targets  only  (Moeller  et  al.,  2004; 
Masulis et al., 2007; Masulis and Nahata, 2009). I measure Acquirer Q as the ratio of the book 
value of acquirer's assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity over the 
                                                 
8 The market-to-book ratio is often used as a proxy for uncertainty when targets are listed but is unavailable here. 12 
 
book value of assets. Book values are as of last fiscal year-end prior to deal announcement. 
The market value of equity equals the acquirer size defined above. 
Leverage  provides  incentives  for  managers  not  to  engage  in  value-destroying 
acquisitions and should prevent them from empire-building. Leverage might therefore have a 
positive  effect  on  acquirer  returns.  Maloney  et  al.  (1993)  document  a  positive  relation 
between acquirer price reaction and its preannouncement leverage situation. Contrary to these 
authors, Moeller et al. (2004), Masulis et al. (2007), and Masulis and Nahata (2009) find an 
insignificant impact of leverage on acquirer returns. Acquirer Leverage is defined as the ratio 
of the acquirer's total debt to total assets as of last fiscal year-end prior to deal announcement.  
Empirical event studies on returns to acquirers of unlisted targets in Europe are rare. 
For instance, Faccio et al. (2006) find that the method of payment, the acquirer size, and the 
relative  size  of  the  deal
9  have  a  significant  effect  on  returns  to  acquirers  of  unlisted 
acquisitions,  while  the  cross-border,  within-industry  and  acquirer  Tobin’s  Q  variables  are 
insignificant.  Last,  Faccio  et  al.  (2006)  observe  that  U.K.  acquirers  achieve  lower 
announcement returns than do acquirers from other Western European countries. To control 
for the possibility that  acquisitions by  firms of English legal origin could overwhelm the 
results  from  other  countries,  I  include  a  dummy  Acq_EnglishLT  indicating  whether  the 
acquirer is from a country with an English legal tradition (La Porta et al. 2000), i.e., in the 
context of this paper, from Republic of Ireland or the United Kingdom. 
 
5.  Sample Characteristics 
 
Table  I  presents  summary  statistics  of  sample  acquisitions  by  announcement  year. 
There is some variation in the number of acquisitions across years. The numbers increase 
through time before declining in 2008. The percentage of all acquisitions that involve PE-
backed targets is steady around an average of 12.5%. Table I also reports annual mean and 
median acquirer size (market value of equity), deal value, and relative deal size. Mean and 
median transaction values are much larger for acquisitions of PE-backed firms, both in dollar 
value and relative value (as a percentage of acquirer market value of equity). This pattern is 
observed each year (at the exception of a slightly lower mean deal value in 2007 and a lower 
mean relative deal size in 2006). Acquirers of PE-backed targets are much larger than those of 
non-PE-backed targets (although the reverse is true in 2008 in terms of mean size). 
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Table  II  gives  the  frequency  distribution  of  acquisitions  by  home  country  of  the 
acquirer and the target. The sample is dominated with acquisitions by U.K. firms (55.7% of 
the  whole  sample;  47.0%  of  the  acquisitions  of  PE-backed  firms).  This  result  is  in  line, 
although the frequency here is a little bit lower, with the proportion of U.K. acquirers of 
unlisted companies in Europe found by Faccio et al. (2006). 22.3% of the targets are from 
outside Western Europe, essentially from the U.S. (13.8% of the total sample). Table III lists 
the corresponding local stock market indexes and currencies (based on acquirer country of 
listing). 
Table IV reports summary statistics divided according to whether the targets are PE-
backed or not. The table indicates the significance for differences in characteristics across the 
two  acquisition  samples,  using  a  standard  t-test  for  differences  in  means  as  well  as  a 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test for differences in medians. Panel A contains deal-
specific data while Panel B concentrates on the characteristics of acquiring firms. First, I 
comment on the characteristics of the whole sample. Next, more importantly for the purposes 
of this investigation, I compare the acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics across the two 
groups of acquisitions. 
The sample median relative deal size is 6.9%. Faccio et al. (2006) report a similar 
figure for their subsample of European unlisted target acquisitions. However, compared to my 
sample, their median acquirer size is approximately twice as large. The difference is likely to 
be due to their filter requiring the deal value to be at least 5 million U.S. dollars (while, 
following the literature, I use a 1 million U.S. dollars threshold). Acquirers in my sample are 
very similar to acquirers in Faccio et al. (2006) in terms of their Tobin’s Qs and also have the 
same  frequency  to  engage  in  international  transactions  (c.  50%).  I  find  that  60%  of  the 
transactions  are  “within-industry”  acquisitions.  This  frequency  is  not  comparable  to  the 
portion reported in Faccio et al. (2006) which is based on a three-digit SIC code matching, but 
is identical to the frequency reported for unlisted acquisitions in the U.S. (Gompers and Xuan, 
2006). Last, the portion of the deals that include at least some payment component in stock is 
very small (22.8%). The vast majority of the deals are exclusively paid for with cash, which is 
a characteristic of European deals (Faccio and Masulis, 2005).  
Turning to the comparison of the characteristics across the two subsamples, I find that 
acquisitions  of  PE-backed  companies  significantly  differ  from  other  unlisted  acquisitions. 
First,  the  mean  and  median  deal  values  (both  in  dollar  value  and  relative  value)  are 
significantly larger when a PE-backed target is involved. In absolute value, acquisitions of 
PE-backed targets are, on average, almost twice as large as other unlisted acquisitions. The 14 
 
largest acquisition of a PE-backed target is, however, more than three times smaller than the 
largest  acquisition  of  a  non-PE-backed  target.  Acquirers  of  PE-backed  targets  are  much 
larger,  have  slightly  higher  Tobin’s  Qs,  and  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  international 
transactions as well as in the acquisitions of high-tech firms. They are less likely to be from 
countries  with  an  English  legal  tradition.  However,  the  two  subsamples  do  not  differ 
significantly in the proportion of deals that are at least partially stock-financed, nor in the 
acquirer leverage, or in the frequency of within-industry acquisitions.  
Gompers and Xuan (2006) and Masulis and Nahata (2009) compare the characteristics 
of acquisitions of VC-backed targets to other private acquisitions in the U.S. Even though 
these papers focus on VC-backing rather than on PE-backing, some patterns turn out to be 
very similar to what I have reported above. First, in both Gompers and Xuan (2006) and 
Masulis  and  Nahata  (2009),  the  deal  values  and  acquirer  sizes  are  much  higher  for 
acquisitions of VC-backed targets than for acquisitions of non-VC backed targets. Relative 
sizes  are  also  higher  for  VC-backed  acquisitions  although  the  differences  between  the 
subsamples are less pronounced and significant than in my sample
10. Next, Gompers and 
Xuan (2006) report that acquirers of VC-backed targets have higher Tobin’s Qs (these authors 
however report a larger difference between their two subsamples than I do). Masulis and 
Nahata (2009) find a higher portion of high-tech targets among acquisitions of VC-backed 
firms.  However,  in  their  sample  nearly  72%  of  VC-backed  targets  belong  to  technology 
intensive industries, while I report a frequency of high-tech firms of 27.5% among PE-backed 
targets. This may be explained by the strong focus of venture capitalists in the high-tech 
sector, particularly in the U.S, but a much lower interest in this sector by the PE industry as a 
whole. While I do not observe a significant difference in the proportion of deals involving 
stock as the acquisition currency across the two acquisition subsamples, U.S. acquisitions of 
VC-backed targets involve much more frequently stock payment than acquisitions of other 
private targets (Masulis and Nahata, 2009).  
In  Table  V,  I  explore  the  combined  effect  of  the  above  deal  and  acquirer 
characteristics in a multivariate setting. I estimate a logistic model predicting whether a deal 
involves a PE-backed or a non-PE-backed target. The dependent variable is the PE-backed 
Target indicator. Independent variables include the acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics 
defined in section 4.Taken together, the acquirer size and relative deal size also account for 
                                                 
10 Median relative sizes reported by Gompers and Xuan (2006) for acquisitions of VC-backed and non-VC-
backed companies are respectively roughly the same as the ones I find in my two subsamples. However figures 
are not comparable to the relative sizes reported by Masulis and Nahata (2009) because these authors require that 
the relative size is at least 10% for a transaction to be included in their sample. 15 
 
the deal size; hence, I exclude the deal size variable in the regression. The results confirm 
that,  compared  to  other  unlisted  acquisitions,  acquisitions  of  PE-backed  targets  are 
significantly  more  likely  to  involve  larger  targets  relative  to  acquirer  size,  as  well  as  to 
concern high-tech targets and larger acquirers. Deals involving PE-backed targets are also 
significantly more likely to be diversifying transactions and to be, at least partially, stock-
financed (while both coefficient were not significant in the univariate comparison, the sign of 
the differences between the two sub-samples was the same). In this multivariate setting, the 
indicators for cross-border deals, acquirer Tobin’s Qs, and acquirer English legal tradition 
become insignificant. Leverage remains insignificant. 
 
6.  Empirical Results on the Effects of PE-Backing on Acquirer Returns 
 
a.  Univariate Analysis of Acquisition Returns  
 
First  rows  in  Table  VI  reports  mean  and  median  three-day  cumulative  abnormal 
returns (CARs) for acquirers of unlisted firms, and separately  for acquirers of PE-backed 
targets and for acquirers of non-PE-backed targets. The European market reacts favorably to 
the acquisitions of unlisted companies with acquirers earning on average a 1.99% positive 
CAR. The mean positive CAR for acquirers of unlisted firms is consistent with previous 
studies both in the U.S and Europe (Chang, 1998; Faccio et al., 2006; Fuller et al., 2002; 
Moeller  et  al.,  2004).  Univariate  tests  indicate  that  the  market  reacts  significantly  less 
positively to acquisition announcements of PE-backed companies. The mean (median) CAR 
for acquisition announcements of PE-backed targets is 1.12% (0.45%), which is significantly 
lower than the mean (median) CAR of 2.11% (0.97%) for acquisition announcements of non-
PE-backed targets. 
Table VI then tabulates acquirer mean and median three-day CARs for each backing 
status (PE, non-PE) across different subsamples based on deal and acquirer characteristics 
(Panel A and Panel B, respectively). For continuous variables, the sample is divided into two 
groups whether the variable takes a value which is above (high) or below (low) the median.  
Mean and median CARs are always lower for acquirers of PE-backed firms than for 
acquirers  of  non-PE-backed  firms,  regardless  of  the  subsample.  The  magnitude  and 
significance  of  the  difference  in  mean  and  median  CARs  are,  however,  varying  across 
subsamples. For instance, the first rows of Panel A indicate that the differences in CARs are 
statistically significant for larger deals (both in dollar value and relative value), but are not 16 
 
significant for smaller transactions even if the magnitude of the differences in CARs between 
the two subsamples (PE-backed, non-PE-backed) remain important in value. 
 
b.  Multivariate Results of Acquisition CARs 
 
The previous results analyze returns to acquirers using univariate comparisons and 
appear to demonstrate that the market, while reacting positively to acquisition announcements 
of PE-backed targets, reacts significantly less favorably than to acquisition announcements of 
other unlisted firms. In this section, I perform multivariate tests to determine whether the “PE-
backing effect” subsists to the inclusion of a panel of independent variables.  
In Table VII, I estimate models using OLS regressions where the dependent variable is 
the acquirer 3-day CAR. Independent variables include the PE-backed Target indicator as 
well as the acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics defined in section 4. Taken together, the 
acquirer size and relative deal size also account for the deal size; hence, I exclude the deal 
size variable from the regressions. Regression (1) in Table VII is the basic specification run to 
investigate  the  effect  of  PE-backing  on  acquirer  CARs.  Regression  (2)  varies  the  basic 
specification by including year and industry dummies based on two-digit acquirer SIC code, 
whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. In regression (3), I use the same specification 
as  in  regression  (2)  except  that  I  add  indicators  for  English,  German,  French,  and 
Scandinavian  acquirer  legal  systems  (La  Porta  et  al.,  2000)  as  well  as  interaction  terms 
between these legal code indicators and the PE-Backed Target indicator (I also eliminate the 
intercept term). Regressions (4) and (5) in Table VII replicate the specification of regression 
(2) but differ from it due to the sample used, as defined hereafter. 
Consistent with the univariate results from the previous section, regression (1) shows 
that acquirer CARs are significantly lower when the target is PE-backed. The coefficient of 
the  PE-backed  Target  indicator  is  negative  and  highly  statistically  significant  (p-
value<0.001). The “PE-effect” is robust to the inclusion of variables that have been shown to 
be  significant  in  explaining  CARs  in  prior  literature.  In  regression  (2),  the  indicator  PE-
backed Target continues to be negative and highly statistically significant (p-value<0.01). In 
both regressions (1) and (2), the Relative Size, Acquirer Size, and Acq_EnglishLT indicators 
are significant. Consistent with prior studies on unlisted transactions in the U.S. (Fuller et al., 
2002, Masulis and Nahata, 2009), the coefficient of the relative deal size is positive and 
significant. Further, the coefficient of the acquirer market value of the equity (i.e., acquirer 
size) is negative and significant, as evidenced in Masulis and Nahata (2009) and in Faccio et 17 
 
al. (2006) for unlisted target acquisitions in the U.S. and in Europe, respectively. Acquirers 
from a country with an English legal tradition achieve lower announcement period CARs than 
do  continental  European  acquirers,  in  line  with  the  results  of  Faccio  et  al.  (2006).  The 
coefficient  of  the  Within-Industry  variable  is  surprisingly  negative  and  significant  in 
regression  (1).  It  becomes,  however,  insignificant  when  controlling  for  industry  and  year 
effects, which is consistent with Fuller et al. (2002), Masulis and Nahata (2009), and Faccio et 
al. (2006) finding no significant synergy expectation effect on returns to acquirers of unlisted 
firms. Last, regression (2) shows that acquirers of firms that belong to technology intensive 
industries achieve higher CARs. None of the other independent variables is significant at the 
0.10 level. 
Regression (3) in Table VII assesses whether the market perception of the role of PE 
investors substantially differ across acquirer legal systems. I find that all the interaction terms 
are  negative.  Further,  all  interaction  terms  are  significant  except  for  the  Scandinavian 
acquirers.  This  suggests  that,  acquisitions  of  PE-backed  companies  generate  a  significant 
smaller  wealth  increase  for  shareholders  than  do  acquisitions  of  non-PE-backed  firms, 
regardless of the quality of investor protection provided by legal systems. The results on the 
other independent variables are unchanged from regression (2). 
Because no restriction has been imposed on the targets country of incorporation, the 
whole sample includes targets from various origins; almost one fourth of the deals involve a 
target from outside Western Europe. I want to check if my prior results could be affected by 
the heterogeneity in target origins. Hence, regression (4) is run on a subsample including 
transactions in which targets are from Western Europe only. Moreover, privately held firms 
are typically much smaller than publicly traded acquirers. The whole sample thus includes 
many acquisitions of very small targets compared to the size of their acquirers. In these deals, 
acquirer CARs are likely to be small. Some authors require the target size to be at least 10% 
of the acquirer size for the transaction to be included in their sample (Masulis and Nahata, 
2009). Regression (5) uses only those transactions in which the relative size of the target 
compared to the size of acquirer is at least 10%. In regressions (4) and (5), the coefficient of 
the PE-Backed Target indicator is still negative and statistically very significant (p-value< 
0.01). The “PE-backing effect” holds on both subsamples. The magnitude of the coefficient is 
even  higher  when  I  focus  on  acquisitions  of  larger  targets.  The  results  on  the  other 
independent variables are unchanged from previous regressions, except that Acquirer Size and 
Acq_EnglishLT  become  insignificant  for  European  targets  and  for  large  acquisitions 
respectively. 18 
 
Overall, across all specifications in Table VII, the coefficient of the PE-Backed Target 
indicator is negative and statistically very significant indicating that the presence of PE firms 
in the targets lowers returns to acquirers. The results in Table VII are consistent with the 
certification and negotiating role of PE investors in the sale process.  
 
7.  Robustness Check: A Propensity Score Matching Approach   
 
As discussed in section 5, acquisitions of PE-backed companies significantly differ 
from other unlisted acquisitions. They are significantly more likely to involve larger targets 
relative to acquirer size, as well as to concern high-tech targets and larger acquirers. They are 
more likely to be diversifying transactions and to be, at least partially, stock-financed (see 
Table V). Because these differences may be responsible for differences in CARs and may bias 
the estimates based on OLS discussed in section 6, I address this selection concern.  
I use  a propensity score matching procedure to create  a sample of non-PE-backed 
targets that is comparable to the PE-backed sample across the above characteristics. Many 
recent studies employ such a matching method in corporate finance (Villalonga, 2004) and 
more specifically in PE/VC settings (Masulis and Nahata, 2009; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Lee 
and Masulis, 2008). 
The first step in the propensity score matching procedure is to compute the estimated 
likelihood of an acquisition involving a PE-backed target on the sample of all unlisted targets. 
In regression (1) of Table VIII, I re-estimate the logistic model predicting whether a deal 
involves a PE-backed or a non- PE-backed target used in section 5, however suppressing the 
independent variables that have been found to be insignificant in section 5.  
I compute the propensity score (or estimated probability of a deal to involve a PE-
backed target) for each transaction of the initial sample from the coefficient estimates reported 
in regression (1) of Table VIII combined with each transaction’s regressor values. Propensity 
score is available for 249 acquisitions of PE-backed targets and 1759 acquisitions of non-PE-
backed targets. Next, I define quartiles (or blocks) of the propensity score distribution for 
acquisitions of PE-backed firms. Acquisitions of non-PE-backed firms are stratified into one 
of the block defined above
11. Within each block, I check for each variable specified in the 
logistic regression (including the propensity score itself) whether the differences in means 
between the sample of acquisitions of PE-backed firms and the sample of acquisitions of non-
                                                 
11 I discard all acquisitions of non-PE backed firms with an estimated propensity score lower (higher) than the 
minimum (maximum) of the propensity score for acquisitions of PE-backed firms. 19 
 
PE-backed targets are significant or not. If all blocks are well balanced, i.e, if the t-statistics 
are not significant for most variables, the procedure ends. However, if a block is not well 
balanced, the block is divided into two finer blocks. Ultimately, the sample is divided in 10 
blocks. 
Next, I pair each acquisition of a PE-backed target with the deal involving a non-PE-
backed target with the nearest propensity score (in absolute value and without replacement) 
within the same block. I also require that the selected matched deal has the same three-digit 
SIC  codes  if  possible,  otherwise  the  same  two-digit  SIC  codes  (if  the  preceding  is 
unavailable), or ultimately the same one-digit SIC codes. This procedure allows me to select a 
matched  sample  of  acquisitions  of  non-PE-backed  firms  that  are  comparable  to  the 
acquisitions of PE-backed firms in a wide range of characteristics in which the two initial 
subsamples  differ.  The  remaining  unmatched  comparison  sample  becomes  useless  and  is 
discarded.  In  order  to  confirm  that  the  two  samples  are  comparable  across  the  relevant 
characteristics,  I  re-estimate  the  logistic  model  predicting  whether  a  deal  involves  a  PE-
backed or a non- PE-backed target using the matched sample and check that none of the 
coefficients of the independent regressors is significant. Results are reported in regression (2) 
of Table VIII
12. 
In Table IX, I use the matched sample to re-estimate the impact of PE-backing on 
returns to acquirer. Regression (1) uses the exact same specification as the second regression 
in Table VII. Regression (2) is run on the subsample of acquisitions of targets from Western 
Europe. Regression (3) is run on the subsample of acquisitions of targets with a relative size 
above 10%. The coefficient of the indicator variable for PE-backing is negative and highly 
statistically  significant  in  all  specifications.  None  of  the  other  independent  variables  is 
consistently significant at the 10% level (holding aside the relative size variable).  
  
8.  Conclusion 
 
This study investigates whether private equity (PE)-backing of acquired firms has an 
impact  on  announcement  period  abnormal  returns  to  acquirers  in  17  Western  European 
countries  over  the  period  2003-2008.  The  main  finding  is  that  acquisitions  of  PE-backed 
companies generate a significant smaller wealth increase for shareholders than do acquisitions 
                                                 
12 For each of the variables, I also check that the differences in means between the sample of acquisitions of PE-
backed firms and the matched sample of acquisitions of non-PE-backed targets are not significant (results are 
unreported for brevity). 
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of other unlisted firms. This “PE-backing effect” is robust to the inclusion of a battery of 
variables in cross-sectional regressions, including the acquirer size, the relative market values 
of the target and acquiring firms, the method of payment for the target, the acquirer Tobin's Q, 
the  acquirer  leverage,  whether  the  acquisition  is  a  cross-border  transaction,  whether  the 
acquirer  and  the  target  are  in  the  same  industry,  and  whether  the  target  belongs  to  a 
technology intensive industry. Further, the wealth increase associated with acquisitions of 
unlisted targets is significantly lower when targets are PE-backed, regardless of the quality of 
investor  protection  provided  by  legal  systems  (except  for  acquirers  in  countries  with 
Scandinavian legal tradition). Last, using a propensity score matching method on a wide range 
of characteristics in which the two groups of acquisitions differ in the initial sample, I confirm 
that the presence of PE firms in the targets lowers returns to acquirers. I suggest that the 
differing  market  reactions  to  the  acquisitions  of  PE-backed  targets  versus  other  unlisted 
targets are due to better price negotiating power of PE investors which results in acquirers 
paying a higher price when they buy PE-backed targets.  
Further investigation is necessary to assess whether PE-backed firms are sold at higher 
premiums  than  non-PE-backed  targets.  Measuring  premiums  paid  by  acquirers  is  not 
straightforward  as  premiums  based  on  market  value  are  unavailable  for  unlisted  targets. 
Additionally,  computing  acquisitions  multiples  based  on  target  accounting  information 
require  manually  collecting  new  data  as,  in  most  cases,  target  accounting  information  is 
missing in the Thomson Financial’s Mergers and Acquisitions database for European unlisted 
companies. 
Further research could also consider PE investors as a heterogeneous population and 
investigate whether returns to acquirers are impacted by the characteristics of the PE investors 
involved  in  the  target.  For  instance,  a  growing  literature  has  shed  light  on  differences  in 
investment behavior between independent and dependent (such as subsidiaries of banks or 
corporation)  funds  (Gompers  and  Lerner,  2000;  Hellmann,  Lindsey  and  Puri,  2008).  The 
differences in affiliation may not only alter the investment but also the divestment strategies 
of PE investors since independent investors pursue higher short term performance and face 
harder budget constraint than dependent investors.  
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2003 27 221 248 12,3% 1214,2 949,3 978,1 89,9 65,6 68,3 32,6% 16,9% 18,6%
(10,9%) (89,1%) (100,0%) (281,7) (229,0) (229,4) (39,1) (15,0) (16,4) (11,9%) (6,5%) (6,7%)
2004 45 245 290 14,4% 2396,7 1154,0 1346,8 231,0 76,1 100,2 19,8% 16,5% 17,0%
(15,5%) (84,5%) (100,0%) (1003,0) (221,2) (264,0) (86,4) (13,4) (17,2) (11,7%) (6,8%) (6,9%)
2005 51 339 390 19,4% 3268,5 2270,7 2401,2 286,1 124,3 145,4 22,8% 14,5% 15,6%
(13,1%) (86,9%) (100,0%) (812,0) (239,1) (250,3) (72,5) (16,7) (19,9) (10,2%) (7,0%) (7,4%)
2006 49 364 413 20,5% 3951,5 2287,7 2485,1 230,4 113,5 127,4 16,7% 17,3% 17,2%
(11,9%) (88,1%) (100,0%) (1000,4) (248,9) (267,7) (76,5) (17,5) (21,1) (7,4%) (6,8%) (6,9%)
2007 55 362 417 20,7% 4414,3 3034,7 3216,7 222,2 231,9 230,7 20,1% 15,6% 16,2%
(13,2%) (86,8%) (100,0%) (673,6) (389,4) (425,3) (63,9) (23,7) (28,7) (10,2%) (6,8%) (7,1%)
2008 24 228 252 12,5% 852,7 1938,4 1835,0 189,6 88,8 98,4 24,9% 15,4% 16,3%
(9,5%) (90,5%) (100,0%) (497,7) (312,0) (315,2) (57,2) (18,0) (19,2) (8,3%) (5,1%) (6,0%)
Total 251 1759 2010 100,0% 3044,6 2066,8 2188,9 221,0 125,5 137,5 21,7% 16,0% 16,7%
(12,5%) (87,5%) (100,0%) (737,9) (261,0) (282,4) (65,4) (17,6) (20,8) (10,2%) (6,6%) (6,9%)
Mean Acquirer Size ($mil)
(Median)
Year





Sample Distribution by Announcement Year
Number of Acquisitions
(% of Total Sample Each Year)
The sample consists of 2010 acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public acquirers from 17 Western European countries between 2003 and 2008. Acquisitions are listed by













United Kingdom 118 1001 1119 93 749 842
Ireland-Rep 4 44 48 5 26 31
United States 48 230 278
Australia 1 22 23
Canada 2 19 21
India 0 7 7
Utd Arab Em 0 7 7
South Africa 0 5 5
Singapore 0 5 5
Israel 1 4 5
Other 1 15 16
Total English Law 122 1045 1167 151 1089 1240
% of Total (48,6%) (59,4%) (58,1%) (60,2%) (61,9%) (61,7%)
French Law
France 24 110 134 18 83 101
Italy 9 57 66 6 55 61
Spain 7 52 59 7 46 53
Netherlands 17 50 67 8 37 45
Belgium 5 23 28 3 13 16
Portugal 2 11 13 2 8 10
Greece 0 11 11 0 7 7
Luxembourg 1 4 5 1 1 2
Russian Fed 1 11 12
Brazil 0 8 8
Mexico 0 6 6
Turkey 0 5 5
Other 0 16 16
Total French Law 65 318 383 46 296 342
% of Total (25,9%) (18,1%) (19,1%) (18,3%) (16,8%) (17,0%)
Scandinavian Law
Sweden 22 149 171 19 78 97
Norway 9 82 91 2 56 58
Finland 9 47 56 5 30 35
Denmark 1 30 31 5 29 34
Total Scandinavian Law 41 308 349 31 193 224
% of Total (16,3%) (17,5%) (17,4%) (12,4%) (11,0%) (11,1%)
German Law
Germany 12 58 70 16 118 134
Switzerland 7 22 29 4 19 23
Austria 4 8 12 2 10 12
China 0 7 7
Other 1 16 17
Total German Law 23 88 111 23 170 193
% of Total (9,2%) (5,0%) (5,5%) (9,2%) (9,7%) (9,6%)
Other 0 11 11
% of Total 0,0% 0,6% 0,5%
Total 251 1759 2010 251 1759 2010
Targets
Table II
Sample Distribution by Home Country of the Acquirer and the Target
The sample consists of 2010 acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public acquirers from 17 Western European
countries between 2003 and 2008. Acquisitions are listed by home country of the acquirer and the target. Figures are broken into
groups by legal tradition and whether targets are PE-backed or not. 26 
 
N % N % N %
United Kingdom 1131 56,3% 119 47,4% 1012 57,5% FTSE ALL SHARE  £
Sweden 174 8,7% 22 8,8% 152 8,6% OMX AFFARSVARLDENS GENERAL  SK
France 137 6,8% 25 10,0% 112 6,4% SBF 120  E
Norway 92 4,6% 9 3,6% 83 4,7% OSLO SE OBX  NK
Germany 73 3,6% 14 5,6% 59 3,4% DAX 30 PERFORMANCE  E
Italy 65 3,2% 8 3,2% 57 3,2% FTSE ITALIA ALL SHARE  E
Netherlands 60 3,0% 15 6,0% 45 2,6% AEX INDEX (AEX)  E
Spain 59 2,9% 7 2,8% 52 3,0% IBEX 35  E
Finland 56 2,8% 9 3,6% 47 2,7% OMX HELSINKI (OMXH)  E
Republic of Ireland 42 2,1% 3 1,2% 39 2,2% IRELAND SE OVERALL (ISEQ)  E
Switzerland 30 1,5% 8 3,2% 22 1,3% SWISS MARKET  SF
Denmark 29 1,4% 1 0,4% 28 1,6% OMX COPENHAGEN BMARK (OMXCB)  DK
Belgium 27 1,3% 5 2,0% 22 1,3% BEL 20  E
Portugal 13 0,6% 2 0,8% 11 0,6% PORTUGAL PSI-20  E
Greece 11 0,5% 0 0,0% 11 0,6% ATHEX COMPOSITE  E
Austria 11 0,5% 4 1,6% 7 0,4% WIENER BOERSE INDEX (WBI)  E
Total 2010 100,0% 251 100,0% 1759 100,0%
Table III
Sample Distribution by Acquirer Country of Listing, Local Market Index and Currency





Stock Market Index Currency
The sample consists of 2010 acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public acquirers from 17 Western European countries between 2003 and 2008.
Acquisitions are listed by acquirer country of listing (16 countries of listing, no acquirers being listed in Luxemburg). Figures are broken into two groups whether
targets are PE-backed or not.27 
 
Mean Median
Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Deal Value PE-backed Targets 251 221,0 65,4 530,0 1,5 4632,3 24,5 190,0 *** ***
Non-PE-backed Targets 1759 125,5 17,6 628,3 1,0 15648,6 6,6 51,3
Total 2010 137,5 20,8 617,6 1,0 15648,6 7,1 65,0
Relative Size PE-backed Targets 251 21,7% 10,2% 30,0% 1,1% 191,5% 4,2% 26,7% *** ***
Non-PE-backed Targets 1759 16,0% 6,6% 27,9% 1,0% 272,6% 2,7% 16,7%
Total 2010 16,7% 6,9% 28,2% 1,0% 272,6% 2,8% 17,6%
Within-Industry  PE-backed Targets 251 56,2% 1,0 0,50 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0 n.s n.s
Non-PE-backed Targets 1759 60,3% 1,0 0,49 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0
Total 2010 59,8% 1,0 0,49 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0
Cross-Border  PE-backed Targets 251 54,2% 1,0 0,50 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0 ** **
Non-PE-backed Targets 1759 47,5% 0,0 0,50 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0
Total 2010 48,3% 0,0 0,50 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0
High-Tech Target  PE-backed Targets 251 27,5% 0,0 0,45 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0 *** ***
Non-PE-backed Targets 1759 19,7% 0,0 0,40 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0
Total 2010 20,7% 0,0 0,41 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0
Stock PE-backed Targets 249 24,1% 0,0 0,43 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0 n.s n.s
Non-PE-backed Targets 1759 22,6% 0,0 0,42 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0
Total 2008 22,8% 0,0 0,42 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0
Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics
Acquirer Size PE-backed Targets 251 3044,6 737,9 10907,1 6,0 142215,6 148,8 2426,1 n.s ***
Non-PE-backed Targets 1759 2066,8 261,0 9695,7 1,3 173009,3 88,5 893,2
Total 2010 2188,9 282,4 9857,5 1,3 173009,3 92,4 1050,6
Acquirer Q  PE-backed Targets 247 2,21 1,74 1,50 0,48 12,15 1,35 2,59 n.s *
Non-PE-backed Targets 1747 2,14 1,68 2,09 0,42 46,89 1,31 2,28
Total 1994 2,15 1,69 2,02 0,42 46,89 1,31 2,33
Acquirer Leverage  PE-backed Targets 247 18,9% 15,9% 17,2% 0,0% 95,2% 4,5% 28,1% n.s n.s
Non-PE-backed Targets 1745 19,4% 17,4% 17,1% 0,0% 184,1% 5,0% 29,1%
Total 1992 19,3% 17,2% 17,1% 0,0% 184,1% 4,9% 28,9%
Acq_EnglishLT PE-backed Targets 251 48,6% 0,0 0,50     0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0 *** ***
Non-PE-backed Targets 1759 59,4% 1,0 0,49     0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0
Total 2010 58,1% 1,0 0,49     0,0 1,0 0,0 1,0
Table IV
Summary Statistics
Min. Max. Q1 Q3
PE vs. Non-PE
Sample # Mean Median St.Dev.
The sample consists of 2010 acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public acquirers from 17 Western European countries
between 2003 and 2008. Panel A summarizes deal-specific data and Panel B reports characteristics of the acquiring firms. Figures
are broken into two groups whether targets are PE-backed or not. Variable definitions are given in Appendix. Significance for
differences in means is based on the t-test. Significance for differences in medians is based on the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank
sum test. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.
Variable28 
 
Dependent variable : PE-backed Target
Coeff. z-Stat.
Relative Size 1,055 (5,28) ***
Within-Industry -0,258 -(1,82) *
Cross-Border -0,058 -(0,38)
HighTech Target 0,579 (3,45) ***
Stock 0,307 (1,71) *
log (Acquirer Size) 0,335 (7,79) ***
Acquirer Q 0,013 (0,51)
Acquirer Leverage -0,768 -(1,51)
Acq_EnglishLT -0,149 -(0,96)




Obs with Dep=0 1745
Obs with Dep=1 245
The sample consists of 2010 acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public
acquirers from 17 Western European countries between 2003 and 2008. The table
presents estimates from a logistic model predicting whether a deal involves a PE-
backed or a non-PE-backed target. The dependent variable in the model is the PE-
backed Target indicator. Independant variables include deal- and acquirer-specific
characteristics. Variable definitions are given in Appendix. The z-stats are based on
QML (Huber/White) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Asterisks denote
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.
Table V
Predicting Whether a Deal Involves a PE-Backed Target Using a Logit Model29 
 
CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-1,+1]
PE-backed Targets Non-PE-backed Targets Total
(1) (2)
Total Mean 1,12% 2,11% 1,99% **
Median 0,45% 0,97% 0,91% ***
# 251 1759 2010
Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Deal Value Low Mean 0,24% 1,83% 1,74% n.s
Median 0,07% 0,93% 0,91% n.s
# 56 949 1005
High Mean 1,37% 2,44% 2,23% **
Median 0,53% 1,08% 0,93% **
# 195 810 1005
Relative Size Low Mean -0,04% 0,67% 0,60% n.s
Median -0,11% 0,32% 0,30% n.s
# 99 906 1005
High Mean 1,87% 3,64% 3,37% **
Median 1,08% 2,17% 2,03% ***
# 152 853 1005
Within-Industry  No Mean 1,50% 2,25% 2,15% n.s
Median 0,50% 1,14% 1,01% n.s
# 110 698 808
Yes Mean 0,82% 2,02% 1,88% *
Median 0,30% 0,90% 0,81% **
# 141 1061 1202
Cross-Border  No Mean 0,32% 2,17% 1,96% ***
Median -0,01% 0,98% 0,93% ***
# 115 924 1039
Yes Mean 1,79% 2,05% 2,01% n.s
Median 0,53% 0,95% 0,91% n.s
# 136 835 971
High-Tech Target  No Mean 0,91% 2,00% 1,88% **
Median 0,47% 0,96% 0,91% ***
# 182 1412 1594
Yes Mean 1,65% 2,57% 2,41% n.s
Median 0,38% 1,03% 0,92% n.s
# 69 347 416
Table VI
Univariate Analysis of Acquirer CARs for PE-backed and Non-PE-backed Targets
Difference
(1)-(2)
The sample consists of 2010 acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public acquirers from 17 Western
European countries between 2003 and 2008. The table reports the mean and median Cumulative Abnormal Return
(CAR) for the acquirer stock, which is calculated over the three trading days around the acquisition announcement
[-1,1].Variable definitions are given in Appendix. Figures are broken into two groups whether targets are PE-backed or
not. Figures are also tabulated across deal-specific data (PanelA) and characteristics of acquiring firms (Panel B). For 
continuous variables, the sample is split into two groups whether the variable takes a value which is above (high) or
below (low) the median. Significance for differences in means is based on the t-test. Significance for differences in
medians is based on the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1%
(***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.30 
 
CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-1,+1]
PE-backed Targets Non-PE-backed Targets Total
(1) (2)
Total Mean 1,12% 2,11% 1,99% **
Median 0,45% 0,97% 0,91% ***
# 251 1759 2010
Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics
Acquirer Size Low Mean 0,98% 2,94% 2,77% *
Median 0,43% 1,47% 1,43% **
# 87 918 1005
High Mean 1,19% 1,20% 1,20% n.s
Median 0,47% 0,55% 0,53% n.s
# 164 841 1005
Acquirer Q  Low Mean 1,20% 2,25% 2,13% *
Median 0,82% 1,19% 1,13% n.s
# 119 878 997
High Mean 0,88% 1,99% 1,84% n.s
Median 0,20% 0,79% 0,69% **
# 128 869 997
Acquirer Leverage Low Mean 1,09% 2,05% 1,92% n.s
Median 0,43% 0,97% 0,93% *
# 131 865 996
High Mean 0,97% 2,18% 2,04% *
Median 0,45% 0,95% 0,88% **
# 116 880 996
Acq_EnglishLT No Mean 1,71% 2,58% 2,45% n.s
Median 0,53% 1,22% 1,16% *
# 129 714 843
Yes Mean 0,49% 1,79% 1,65% **
Median 0,43% 0,79% 0,74% *
# 122 1045 1167
Table VI (cont.)
Univariate Analysis of Acquirer CARs for PE-backed and Non-PE-backed Targets
Difference
(1)-(2)
The sample consists of 2010 acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public acquirers from 17 Western
European countries between 2003 and 2008. The table reports the mean and median Cumulative Abnormal Return
(CAR) for the acquirer stock, which is calculated over the three trading days around the acquisition announcement
[-1,1].Variable definitions are given in Appendix. Figures are broken into two groups whether targets are PE-backed or
not. Figures are also tabulated across deal-specific data (PanelA) and characteristics of acquiring firms (Panel B). For 
continuous variables, the sample is split into two groups whether the variable takes a value which is above (high) or
below (low) the median. Significance for differences in means is based on the t-test. Significance for differences in
medians is based on the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1%
(***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.31 
 
Dependent variable : CAR [-1,+1]
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
PE-backed Target -0,016 -(3,32) *** -0,014 -(3,05) *** -0,014 -(2,64) *** -0,022 -(2,80) ***
Relative Size 0,068 (4,45) *** 0,067 (4,40) *** 0,067 (4,40) *** 0,066 (4,01) *** 0,062 (3,20) ***
Within-Industry -0,005 -(1,93) * -0,004 -(1,46) -0,004 -(1,43) -0,004 -(1,32) -0,008 -(1,35)
Cross-Border 0,004 (1,11) 0,003 (0,78) 0,002 (0,70) 0,001 (0,14) 0,004 (0,61)
HighTech Target 0,005 (1,18) 0,009 (2,07) ** 0,009 (2,06) ** 0,008 (1,67) * 0,016 (2,04) **
Stock 0,000 (0,07) 0,000 (0,07) 0,000 (0,05) 0,002 (0,45) -0,003 -(0,48)
Log(Acquirer Size) -0,002 -(2,01) ** -0,002 -(1,96) * -0,002 -(1,74) * -0,002 -(1,33) 0,001 (0,25)
Acquirer Q -0,001 -(0,74) -0,001 -(0,66) -0,001 -(0,66) -0,001 -(0,61) 0,000 -(0,13)
Acquirer Leverage -0,007 -(0,78) -0,005 -(0,57) -0,005 -(0,51) 0,002 (0,15) -0,019 -(1,24)
Acq_EnglishLT -0,006 -(2,08) ** -0,008 -(2,52) ** 0,020 (1,95) * -0,008 -(2,27) ** -0,003 -(0,43)
(Acq_EnglishLT)*(PE-backed Target) -0,014 -(2,16) **
Acq_GermanLT 0,028 (2,10) **
(Acq_GermanLT)*(PE-backed Target) -0,026 -(1,71) *
Acq_FrenchLT 0,025 (2,21) **
(Acq_FrenchLT)*(PE-backed Target) -0,014 -(1,65) *
Acq_ScandLT 0,031 (2,73) ***
(Acq_ScandLT)*(PE-backed Target) -0,010 -(0,69)
C 0,031 (3,36) *** 0,029 (2,65) *** 0,026 (2,14) ** 0,008 (0,38)
Year Dummies N Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies N Y Y Y Y
N 1990 1990 1990 1546 781
R² 10,7% 13,6% 13,7% 15,7% 17,0%
Adjusted R² 10,2% 10,4% 10,3% 11,8% 9,7%
F-statistic  23,705 4,300 3,995 2,337
Prob(F-statistic) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Whole Sample Western Europe Relative Size > 10% Whole Sample 
Table VII
 Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer CARs for PE-backed and Non-PE-backed Targets
The sample consists of 2010 acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public acquirers from 17 Western European countries between 2003 and 2008. The table reports ordinary 
least squares estimates. The dependent variable is the Cumulative AbnormalReturn (CAR) for the acquirer stock and is calculated over the three trading days around the acquisition
announcement [-1, 1]. Independent variables include an indicator of target PE-backing and deal- and acquirer-specific characteristics. Variable definitions are given in Appendix.
Regressions (2) to (5) also include year and industry dummies (based on 2-digit acquirer SIC code), whose coefficient are suppressed. Regressions (1) to (3) are run on the whole
sample. Regression (4) is run on the subsample of acquisitions of targets from Western Europe. Regression (5) is run on the subsample of acquisitions of targets with a relative size




(2) (4) (5) (3)32 
 
Dependent variable : PE-backed Target
Coeff. z-Stat. Coeff. z-Stat.
Relative Size 1,054 (5,46) *** 0,496 (1,43)
Within-Industry -0,252 -(1,79) * 0,129 (0,70)
HighTech Target 0,636 (3,97) *** -0,127 -(0,61)
Stock 0,338 (1,96) * -0,270 -(1,18)
log (Acquirer Size) 0,322 (8,36) *** 0,063 (1,11)
C -4,178 -(14,67) *** -0,461 -(1,04)
N 2008 498
Log likelihood -712,148 -341,980
McFadden R² 5,38% 0,93%
Obs with Dep=0 1759 249
Obs with Dep=1 249 249
(1) (2)
Whole Sample Matched Sample
The whole sample consists of 2010 acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public acquirers from
17 Western European countries between 2003 and 2008. The matched sample represents 249 matched
pairs of acquisitions. The table presents estimates from a logistic modelpredicting whether a deal involves a
PE-backed or a non-PE-backed target. The dependent variable in the model is the PE-backed Target
indicator. Independant variables include deal- and acquirer-specific characteristics. Variable definitions are
given in Appendix. The z-stats are based on QML (Huber/White) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.
Table VIII
Comparison of Whole and Matched Sample Characteristics 
after Propensity Score Matching Procedure33 
 
Dependent variable : CAR [-1,+1]
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
PE-backed Target -0,016 -(2,67) *** -0,014 -(2,08) ** -0,030 -(2,67) ***
Relative Size 0,047 (2,34) ** 0,062 (2,73) *** 0,028 (1,05)
Within-Industry -0,013 -(1,85) * -0,010 -(1,38) -0,014 -(1,11)
Cross-Border 0,010 (1,44) 0,009 (1,09) 0,016 (1,36)
HighTech Target 0,005 (0,65) 0,004 (0,48) 0,009 (0,61)
Stock -0,007 -(0,66) -0,009 -(0,88) -0,010 -(0,72)
Log(Acquirer Size) -0,003 -(0,96) -0,002 -(0,72) -0,001 -(0,30)
Acquirer Q -0,004 -(1,89) * -0,001 -(0,35) -0,006 -(1,74) *
Acquirer Leverage 0,031 (1,52) 0,054 (2,31) ** 0,015 (0,49)
Acq_EnglishLT -0,002 -(0,37) -0,003 -(0,34) 0,004 (0,28)
C 0,052 (1,75) * 0,033 (1,03) 0,026 (0,38)
Year Dummies Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y
N 490 371 232
R² 18,8% 19,9% 24,1%
Adjusted R² 9,3% 8,0% 6,2%
F-statistic  1,984 1,667 1,349
Prob(F-statistic) 0,000 0,006 0,089
Table IX
Robustness Check : Analysis of Acquirer CARs Using a Propensity Score Matching Procedure
The matched sample represents 245 matched pairs of acquisitions of unlisted companies completed by public acquirers
from 17 Western European countries between 2003 and 2008. Half of the sample consists of acquisitions of PE-backed
companies and the other half consists of acquisitions of non-PE-backed companies. Propensity score matching is used
to choose the matching acquisitions of non-PE-backed firms. Regression (1) is run on the whole matched sample.
Regression (2) is run on the subsample of acquisitions of targets from Western Europe. Regression (3) is run on the
subsample of acquisitions of targets with a relative size above 10%. The table reports ordinary least squares estimates.
The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for the acquirer stock and is calculated over the
three trading days around the acquisition announcement [-1, 1] . Independent variables include an indicator of target PE-
backing and deal- and acquirer-specific characteristics. Models also include year and industry dummies (based on 2-
digit acquirer SIC code), whose coefficient are suppressed. Variable definitions are given in Appendix.The t-stats are
based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Asterisks denote statisticalsignificance at the 1% (***),





Relative Size > 10%




CAR [-1,+1] Three-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage) calculated around the announcement day [-1,+1], using
the market model. The market modelparameters are estimated over a period of 240 days, starting 40 days prior
to the event window. Country stock market indexes are used for market returns. Returns have to be available in




PE-backed Target Section 5 of the paper describes the two-step methodology used to identify PE-backed targets Thomson M&A
 (1); VentureXpert;press 
releases and/or investors’ websites 
Deal Value Total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses (in million U.S. dollars).  Thomson M&A
 (1)





Within-Industry Indicator equals 1 if the acquirer’s and the target’s primary 2-digit SIC code coincides, and equals 0 otherwise.  Thomson M&A 
(1)
Cross-Border Indicator equals 1 if the acquirer’s and the target’s home country differ, and is 0 otherwise.  Thomson M&A 
(1)
HighTech Target Indicator takes the value 1 if the target is a High-tech company, 0 otherwise. High-tech companies are defined
as having their primary SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663,3669
(communications equipment), 3674 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829




Loughran and Ritter (2001) and 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003).
Stock Indicator equals 1 if the deal is at least partially stock-financed, 0 otherwise.  Thomson M&A 
(1)
Acquirer Size Acquirer’s market capitalization as of 20 days before the deal announcement (in million U.S. dollars).  Datastream
Acquirer Q Ratio of the book value of acquirer's assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity 
over the book value of assets. Book values are as of last fiscal year-end prior to deal announcement. Market
value of equity equals the Acquirer Size defined above.
Datatream; Worldscope
Acquirer Leverage Ratio of the acquirer's total debt to total assets as of last fiscal year-end prior to deal announcement. Worldscope
Acq_EnglishLT Indicator equals 1 if the acquirer is from a country with an English legal tradition, and equals 0 otherwise. Thomson M&A 
(1); La Porta et al. (2000)
Acq_GermanLT Indicator equals 1 if the acquirer is from a country with a German legal tradition, and equals 0 otherwise. Thomson M&A 
(1); La Porta et al. (2000)
Acq_FrenchLT Indicator equals 1 if the acquirer is from a country with a French legal tradition, and equals 0 otherwise. Thomson M&A 
(1); La Porta et al. (2000)
Acq_ScandLT Indicator equals 1 if the acquirer is from a country with a Scandinavian legal tradition, and equals 0 otherwise. Thomson M&A 
(1); La Porta et al. (2000)
(1)Thomson M&A refers to Thomson Financial’s Mergers and Acquisitions database 
Appendix : Variable Definitions and Sources
Acquirer Return
Deal Characteristics
Acquirer Characteristics